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CONFIDENTIAL

24 July 1947

From : Peter Engelmann

Subject : German Sources on the U.S.S.R. and related subjects

Ref.(a) : Report : " German Intelligence on the U.S.S.R., on
Russian dominated areas and the Comintern"

1. Reference (a) contains an analysis of present and possible future German sources for background and current intelligence on the U.S.S.R. It lists shortcomings observed in the past and suggests measures to improve the situation. The following draft outlines these measures in greater detail.

2. Subject information is collected by U.S. military, naval and civilian government agencies from captured documents, PW interrogations, and various other overt and possibly covert sources. It is processed and evaluated by numerous agencies. At present, proper planning and coordination appear to be lacking.

3. It is recommended that within CIG a German Control Desk be established to facilitate coordination of the collecting, processing and evaluation of subject information, to study methods for more efficient and economic procedures, and to submit appropriate recommendations.

Functions

4. The German Control Desk ^{SHOULD} ~~is to~~ serve all agencies concerned as an expert adviser on subject source. It ^{SHOULD} ~~shall~~ not engage in the collecting, processing, or evaluation proper, but ^{SHOULD} ~~shall~~ assist by liaison and technical advice in such activities. Upon request it ^{SHOULD} ~~shall~~ submit recommendations for the increased or more economic utilization of subject source.

5. Personnel assigned to the German Control Desk ^{SHOULD} ~~shall~~ not exceed 25 officers and / or civilians. They ^{SHOULD} ~~shall~~ be directed to carry out the following activities:

- (a) All available background and overt information is to be identified as to location, quality, and administering agency, and a German source roster is to be prepared on the basis of such rosters and accession lists which have been prepared by or will be requested from collecting and processing agencies.
- (b) From the ~~Axis~~ German source roster those individual sources are to be selected which appear to be of permanent value, and provisions are to be made whereby these sources (documents, PW's still held or already released, returnees, etc.) can be located at all times.
- (c) The desk shall deal with current and covert information only when so directed and within the limitations established by the various commands or agencies procuring or administering this information.
- (d) Requests of evaluating or planning agencies for specific information, which cannot be answered directly by the Desk, are to be relayed to collecting or processing agencies for appropriate action.
- (e) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~The Desk shall submit recommendations for more efficient and economic utilization of overt sources for background information.
- (f) When so directed the Desk shall ^{SUBMIT} ~~make~~ recommendations for the utilization of subject source for purposes other than the gathering of background information.
- (g) Liaison is to be maintained to agencies working with other Axis sources ^{Japanese} on ^{on} (for instance: ~~XXXXXX~~ sources ~~in~~ the Far U.S.S.R.) and possibilities for a future coordination are to be studied.
- (h) The German Control Desk must at all times be prepared to report to ~~the~~ 50X1 and such agencies as designated by the Director, CIG, on the work 50X1 carried out with subject information. For this purpose, all agencies collecting processing or evaluating ^{OVERT} subject information ^{FROM GERMAN SOURCES} should be directed to transmit

~~transmit~~ to the German Control Desk monthly activity reports in standard form.

(g) Every third month and whenever special circumstances warrant, the German Control Desk is to submit via the Director, CIG, a report containing a.) an account of all overt projects carried out at that time with subject information and b.) recommendations *EFFICIENT (AND ECONOMIC) UTILIZATION OF SUBJECTS & SUBJECT SOURCES* for future projects. For important recommendations the German Control Desk shall be authorized to request a directive.

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Organization and Personnel

6. It is recommended that the German Control Desk be established by the Director, CIG, and that a Chief of the Control Desk be appointed by him. The following organizational outline is suggested.

7. The Chief of the German Control Desk shall direct and supervise the activities of (a) the Office of the Chief, (b) the Washington, D.C. Branch, and (c) the Frankfurt, Germany, Branch.

8. The Office of the Chief, German Control Desk, shall be composed of four representatives from other agencies concerned and such technical personnel as required. The representatives shall be selected as to represent best all agencies interested as well as the various methods by which subject information is utilized, and they shall be assigned directly to CIG. One representative each shall be responsible for (a) preparation of reports and liaison, (b) identification and classification of sources, (c) activities of the Washington Branch, (d) activities of the Frankfurt Branch. The Office of the Chief shall carry out the following missions :

(a) Study the most efficient and economic methods for utilization of subject source ;

(b) Determine sources of permanent value ;

(c) Prepare for the Director, CIG, all reports to be submitted to ☐ and to other agencies designated ;

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(d) Direct and support administratively the missions of the Washington and Frankfurt Branches ;

(e) Maintain liaison with agencies working with other Axis sources.

To carry out these missions the Office of the Chief, German Control Desk, shall be authorized to maintain a direct working contact with all U.S. military, naval, and civilian government agencies concerned under such stipulations as ^{MADE} established by the Director, CIG.

9. The Washington Branch, German Control Desk, shall be composed of ~~the~~ a Chief of the Washington Branch and such technical personnel as required. It shall control subject information in the American continent and such other areas of importance which are not covered by the Frankfurt Branch. It shall be charged with the following missions :

- (a) To ascertain all subject overt information within the area assigned ;
- (b) To prepare on the basis of own investigation and of information received from the Frankfurt Branch a roster of all overt sources;
- (c) To make provisions within its area so that all sources designated as of permanent value can be located at any time ;
- (d) To relay to appropriate collecting or processing agencies requests for information received by the German Control Desk which can not be answered by from sources available at the Desk.

~~The Washington Branch shall be prohibited from dealing with current or covert information.~~

10. The Frankfurt Branch, German Control Desk, shall be attached to the Commanding General, U.S.Army, European Theater (MED). It shall be composed of a Chief of the

Frankfurt Branch and such technical personnel as required. Its foremost function will be maintenance of liaison to the theater, and it shall carry out such missions as directed by the SIA Director, CIG, subject to the limitations attached by the Theater Command. It shall be responsible for subject information in Europe, North Africa, and the Near ^{East}. With approval of the Theater Command and ~~transmission~~ the support of MID it shall carry out the following specific missions:

- (a) ~~Be~~ Ascertain overt sources for subject information within the area assigned;
- (b) Make provisions so that all sources designated as of permanent value in this area can be located at any time ;
- (c) Investigate, when so directed, new methods for utilisation of subject source.

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Germans with relatives in Russian controlled areas ;

b. German documents, for instance :

Present German official and business files - Captured German files - German language publications of Russian origin or sponsorship - Studies and reports contained in German business, technical, or scientific files not captured;

c. Russo-German communications, for instance :

Radio, mail telegraph (including former German intercept techniques and facilities) - Train, plane and bus traffic - Harbor and shipping reports (seamen and longshoremen) .

This list contains sources for current and covert as well as for background and overt information, which require altogether different methods for gathering and channeling. Nevertheless, a systematic coordination and direction of all German sources appears desirable at the highest level.

5. On a lower level intelligence will be confronted with the fact that presumably at no one time will it be possible to utilize simultaneously all German sources available in theory. The more limited the numbers of sources, the more systematic should be the efforts to extract a maximum of information. To assure this, additional organizational measures may be required.

Each agencies knows best its own requirements and difficulties. With regard to the Soviet Union, however, many agencies are faced with the common problem of scarcity of reliable information. Since Germany has been one of the most important sources and since almost all agencies concerned share in the utilization of this source, establishment of a German Control Desk has been suggested.

This desk should be cognizant of all available German sources, their location and relative value. It should not engage in any gathering, processing, or evaluation proper, but should be ready and equipped to assist the various agencies concerned. Dealing constantly and exclusively with German sources on the U.S.S.R. the desk would be in a position to answer specific questions and to advise, when asked, on methods for present and future utilization.

The desk should be set up in such a manner as to correct especially the following shortcomings noted in the past.

6. Various U.S. agencies have been engaged in the collecting and processing of German background information on the U.S.S.R., particularly of captured documents, PW statements, and "essays" by German officers. Efforts for coordination were often obliterated by the pressing problems of disposal. Even today apparently no one desk or agency has exact knowledge of the location and contents of all these sources. Consequences are illustrated by the following example.

ONI learned through a German PW report that important Russian coastal areas have been mapped by the advanced German Schultz-Kampfenkel method. These maps would be valuable to naval intelligence; the report stated they might be located in Bavaria. By the circuitous route of official channels a request could be forwarded and in due time the maps might be forthcoming. Intelligence assignments, however, seldom permit for this "due time", and the work involved in official requests limits this procedure automatically to the most important subjects.

It is possible that the maps in questions already have been located and brought to the U.S. by an other agency. However, in the absence of a central desk cognizant of all German sources, no agency can be expected to answer today questions concerning the whereabouts of important German source material, in a manner which is definite and complete.

7. Compilation of reports from German sources has been undertaken in the absence of proper coordination. A report on German and Russian "Espionage - Sabotage - Conspiracy", for instance, was compiled from German sources by ONI. After this report was published it was learned that the War Department had been engaged in a similar project but that "ONI beat MID to it". The ONI report showed serious loopholes, as will almost any report dealing with the U.S.S.R. Some of these loopholes might have been filled had there been access to all German sources. Actually, only a few of the many German documents/press collections were available. It was assumed that other document collections might contain pertinent information. However, they could not be contacted in view of the urgency characteristic for the compilation of almost any intelligence report, and in the absence of a central desk which could have ascertained such sources and provided and-provided/a speedy channel of access to the material. One highly important collection however, OMDS, was screened by ONI as well as MID personnel for information on the subject, each one locating (and keeping to himself) some of the pertinent files.

8. Adequate evaluation of German information on the U.S.S.R. will require better facilities for the exchange of information between all agencies concerned. One phase of this problem is illustrated by the following developments:

Analysis of the operations of the secret German naval organization "Etappe" shows that any set-up of this type offers considerable advantages to a naval power which lacks bases or allies overseas. Nothing is known which would indicate that the Soviet Union previously established an Etappe-like organization, but it must be assumed that she will be aware of the implications of the German example. Thus it might have been advisable to pay special attention to former German Etappe personnel. In any event, U.S. Naval Intelligence would be materially interested in any indication that the Soviet Union is setting up an "Etappe". Such indications might be noted at first in economic and trade manipulations and not in the fields of shipping or naval activities. Therefore efforts of various gathering agencies might be required to ascertain possible Soviet "Etappe" activities at an early date. Present organization, lacking a central liaison, does not facilitate such efforts.

9. The "Etappe" example points to the desirability of closer connections between background ("static") and current ("dynamic") information originating from German sources and pertaining to the U.S.S.R. Almost any agency is in need of both types of information, and most background evaluation requires a constant flow of current information to be kept up to date. All German sources, no matter whether they serve "static" or "dynamic" intelligence functions, have certain technical features in common, and some sources will change their character from dynamic to static and vice versa. As a general rule, there seems to be little dynamic intelligence which is not also of direct interest to one or the other of the divisions concerned with background information.

Current information, for example, may be sought by MID on Russian night fighting tactics. Intelligence received, however, will usually not be strictly limited to night fighting. Some of the material may concern Russian camouflage techniques and thus would be of equal interest to all branches of the armed forces; figures and facts concerning the production of night fighting equipment may permit valuable conclusions for technical or economic intelligence; etc.

Some current information will always remain inaccessible to background information; security considerations and the special methods of gathering and channeling of current information cannot be interfered with by outside interests. In view of the scarcity of information on the U.S.S.R., however, measures might be considered to somewhat bridge this gap.

10. Any action taken now to alleviate apparent shortcomings in the handling of

German sources should be designed as to meet also foreseeable future problems. In the past information of German origin has constituted an important source of information on the U.S.S.R. In the future the need may arise to expand this source, or to use certain German individuals and facilities for purposes other than the gathering of intelligence. In such eventualities, a central desk well versed in all phases of Russo-German intelligence might contribute information and suggestions.

Presumably it would not be desirable at any time to transmit details concerning a specific situation or project to a desk concerned primarily with sources, and it would not be practical to have such a desk submit suggestions on the basis of its own speculation. Yet from expert knowledge gathered at such a desk might come valuable information or suggestions in answer to specific questions asked.

Among problems which may arise in the field of German sources on the U.S.S.R. are the following:

(a) Circumstances may call for increased American activities to gain information from German sources not heretofore employed, and planning may be required on how such increased information can be obtained without increasing simultaneously the threat to our security.

(b) The U.S.S.R. must be assumed to be engaged in efforts to utilize German sources for the gathering and evaluation of information on the United States and related subjects. Some of these efforts may become apparent in Germany proper while others may be noted first among German groups in the U.S.S.R., in the Western Hemisphere, or elsewhere.

(c) Communist sponsored "International Brigades" with German contingents may pose special intelligence problems.

(d) Communist tactics favor the use of deception, and German individuals, documents, or communications may be used by Russia for such manoeuvres. Therefore additional considerations may have to enter into our utilization of certain German sources. At some date our own planning may give attention to the use of German sources for similar manoeuvres.

(e) In an emergency all direct contacts to sources in Germany may be cut off; at such a time land routes to Northern Europe presumably would be cut as well. Plans for a German underground communications and intelligence system ("R-net") may be required at some date.

11. In conclusion:

Experience gained with German intelligence sources on the U.S.S.R. and on the Comintern points to the fact that adequate planning, coordination, and channels have been lacking. It is known that similar observations have been made by agencies other than ONI.

At present there exists no one desk charged with the control and liaison which is a prerequisite for efficient and economic utilization of any source.

In view of the scarcity of reliable information on the U.S.S.R., of the importance of German sources, and of the technical difficulties encountered in their utilization an inter-departmental policy with regard to German sources on the U.S.S.R. appears desirable.

Coordination of these sources and liaison between the various agencies concerned should be carried out by a special unit set up within CIG.

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